

S P E E C H

MADE IN THE

House of Commons,

I N

E N G L A N D,

By Mr. ^KHEATHCOATE, one of the Aldermen of *London*;

In Support of a BILL for repealing the ALDERMENS
N E G A T I V E.

Very proper to be read at this Time, by all Citizens and
Lovers of LIBERTY and OUR CONSTITUTION.



D U B L I N:

Printed in the Year, M DCC LXIX.
XLIX.

[P R I C E One Penny.]

A
S P E C H

MADE IN THE

House of Commons

IN


ENGLAND



Printed by J. G. Alderman, at the British Museum, London.

Printed by J. G. Alderman, at the British Museum, London.

Printed by J. G. Alderman, at the British Museum, London.



D U B L I N

Printed in the Year MDCCLXX.

[PRICE One Penny.]

To the PRINTER.

SIR,

ALTHO' a Stranger in this Country, and consequently uninterested in the present Struggle between the Aldermen and Citizens of *Dublin*, yet as a Friend to *Liberty*! I cannot be totally silent on this Occasion.

I observe a Speech of that worthy Patriot and true Representative of his Country, Sir *John Bernard*, has been published lately, and that most properly at this Juncture; as it relates to a Power vested in the *Board* of Aldermen of the *CITY* of *LONDON*, which was looked upon most justly to be *Anticonstitutional* (altho' granted by Act of Parliament.)

Now, Sir, as the Meaning of the Negative Power in the Aldermen of *London*, which Sir *John* endeavours by his Speech to have taken away, and in which he happily succeeded; it may not be understood by the Generality of People in the City, I shall endeavour to explain it to you. And shall in the first Place endeavour to shew how the *Board of Aldermen and Common Council* are elected in *LONDON*, and then explain the Nature of this Negative, and leave it to the Gentlemen of this City to compare the Manner in which the Aldermen and Common Council are chosen here; and what the Powers which the *ALDERMEN* of *THIS CITY* take upon themselves to exercise both Negatively and Affirmatively, exclusive of the Common Council and their Fellow-Citizens with that of *London*. Whether this Power is here legally or illegally exercised, (altho' the latter has been warmly contended for with great Strength of Argument)

A

ment)

ment) I shall not take upon me to determine. And first, the City of *LONDON* is divided into twenty-six Wards, and one Aldermen and a Number of Common-Councilmen in proportion to its Size are chosen by the Inhabitants of each Ward paying Scot and Lot; or in other Words, by those Inhabitants who are not on the Poor Rate, but contribute to the Public Taxes; so that the City of *London* is as freely and fairly represented in *COMMON COUNCIL* as they are in *PARLIAMENT*.

Before the Year 1725, from Time immemorial, the Lord Mayor, Board of Aldermen, and Common Council sat together, and voted together, and the Majority of Voices of the whole Body, determined the *Question*, and the Vote of the meanest Member of the Council was as good as that of the greatest Alderman.

But *WALPOLE*, for Reasons that are fully explained in Sir *John Bernard's*, and the following Speech, determined to endeavour to have a Power vested in the Aldermen, exclusive of the Commons; which the then Board of Aldermen not foreseeing the ill Use that might be made of it, greedily caught at.

The Negative Power then given to the Board of Aldermen by this Act was this; *That the Lord Mayor and Board of Aldermen* should sit by themselves in a separate Room, and that the Business should be prepared and sent up to them by the Commons, which if not approved of by fourteen of them, (which made a Majority of the Twenty-six) was stopped.

Now Sir, compare this with the Powers exercised by the *ALDERMEN OF THIS CITY*, and I am sure there will be no Necessity to explain the Difference. I send you *ALDERMAN GEORGE HEATHCOATE's* Speech on this Subject, and doubt not you will publish it with this Letter to explain it. I wish it may serve the Cause of *Liberty*, and am, Sir,

Your humble Servant,

A Londoner.

A

S P E E C H, &c.

S I R,

WHATEVER Character we may have, or whatever Character we may deserve among Foreigners, I hope we shall always take Care to preserve the Character of being a brave and a free People. Foreign Slaves may think as highly as they please, Sir, of the Steadiness of their public Counsels; but among such, I hope, we shall always be deemed a turbulent and unsteady People. This Character must always necessarily attend a free Government; because in all such Governments there have been, there will always be some Minister, or some Set of Ministers forming Schemes for overturning the Liberties of the People, and establishing themselves in arbitrary Power. Such Men are generally, at first, the Idols of the People, and before their latent Designs come to be discovered, they generally prevail with the People to enter into such Measures, or to make such Regulations, as may contribute to the Success of their Designs. But if the People are wise enough, and sufficiently jealous of their Liberties, as the People of this Country, thank God! have always hitherto been, they never fail to discover these Designs before they are ripe for Execution. As soon as they have made this Discovery, they begin to see the evil Tendency of the Measures or Regulations they have been led into, and of course they mutilate the former and repeal the latter. This therefore, which foreign Slaves, as most of the People around us are, impute to a Turbulency or Unsteadiness in our Temper, is nothing but the natural Effect of the Freedom of our Government; and
whilst

whilst the Cause lasts, which, I hope, it will always do, the Effect must continue the same.

The Law, which is now proposed to be repealed, is one of those Regulations we were induced to agree to by such a Minister as I have described: He was once, Sir, the Patron of Liberty, and consequently the Idol of the People; but his future Conduct shewed, that his Friendship to Liberty was pretended, with the only View, that as soon as it suited his Purpose he might secretly stab her to the Heart. Corruption, Sir, was the poisoned Dagger he intended to make use of, and with this Weapon he gave her a Stab, as was clearly pointed out to you by the Report of your Secret Committee; but, I hope, the Stab will not prove mortal; I hope, we shall be able to extract the Poison, and heal up the Wound, before it corrupts the whole Mass of our Constitution.

This Regulation, Sir, which we shall now, I hope, abolish, was the Vehicle contrived by him to convey his Poison to the City of *London*. He knew of what Consequence it might be to him, to get the Government of that City into his Hands, or at least to prevent her opposing any of his future Schemes; and for this Purpose he contrived to throw as much Power into the Hands of the Aldermen as possible, because, by working on their Avarice or their Vanity, he thought, he might prevail with a Majority of them, to make use of their Power upon all Occasions for his Service. This, Sir, was his secret Design in getting such a Regulation agreed to by Parliament, this was the Use he made of it, and this is the Use any future Minister may make of it: Upon the Question then, whether such a Regulation ought to be abolished, I say, upon such a Question, shall we enter into the Inquiry, whether the Aldermen have made a bad use of the Power, by this Means, and with this Design, thrown into their Hands? Is it not enough for us, that such a Regulation may be made a bad Use of; that it certainly will be made a bad Use of by the first wicked Minister this Nation happens to be cursed with,
which,

which, God knows! is a Plague we cannot long expect to be without; and that by making a bad Use of it he may be enabled to overturn our Liberties? Is not all this sufficient to prevail with a *British* House of Commons to abolish such a Regulation, without inquiring, whether or no it has already been made a bad Use of? Certainly it is, Sir: Certainly it must be thought so; if we have the same Regard for our Liberties that our Ancestors were possessed with, and by which they transmitted to us the glorious Title of being *Free-born Englishmen*,

But, Sir, if such an Inquiry were necessary, it would be no difficult Matter to shew, that the Aldermen have made a bad Use of the Power lodged in their Hands by this Regulation, and that every Time they did make use of this Power, it was at the Command of the Minister, and with a View to answer the Purpose for which he got this Power lodged in their Hands. I think it quite unnecessary to give you a full and particular History of the Use they made of this Power, or to examine their Motives at each particular Time; but one of those Times is so remarkable, that I cannot pass it over in Silence. The Convention with *Spain* must be remembered by every Gentleman that hears me, and, I hope, is now tho't to be, by a Majority of this Assembly, what it really was, a most infamous and pernicious Treaty. By that Treaty our then Minister not only sacrificed the Honour but the Trade and Navigation of his Country. Such a Treaty the City of *London* had surely a Concern to oppose, and to prevent its being ratified by his Majesty, if possible. For this Purpose a great Majority of the Common Council resolved to petition his Majesty against it; but as this was properly a Petition against the Minister who advised it, he sent his Orders to the Aldermen, and by their Negative they rendered the Resolution of the Common Council ineffectual. Was not this, Sir, making a bad Use of their Power? Was it not making such an Use of it as might have been of the most pernicious Consequence

to our Trade and Navigation, and consequently to the Interest of the City of *London* in particular? Besides this, Sir, it was a Precedent of a most dangerous Tendency. *Every Subject, and every corporate Body in the Kingdom, have a Right to petition their Sovereign:* The Exercise of this Right may be of great Service to the King, when he happens to be misled by his Ministers; and, when exercised by the City of *London*, must always have a very great Weight, and may very probably make the King sensible of the bad Advice that has been given him; but can this Right ever be exercised by the Citizens of *London* in their corporate Capacity, if they are to be restrained by 14 Aldermen under a corrupt Dependence upon the very Minister, who gave the bad Advice to his Sovereign?

This I think, Sir, is a glaring Instance of the Aldermens having made a bad Use of their Negative; and had the Minister's Slaves among them succeeded in all they attempted at that Time, they would have furnished us with another Instance still more glaring; for they attempted to put a Negative upon the City's petitioning the Parliament against that Convention; but some of the Aldermen, I mean those who were suspected of being bought by the Minister, were not then sufficiently broke, or perhaps not sufficiently paid, and therefore they refused to concur with their ministerial Brethren in this Negative. However, the Attempt shews what may be done by this Negative, when a Minister has got 14 of the Aldermen sufficiently under Discipline. Let the Measures of such a Minister be never so contrary to the publick Good, let his Designs against our Liberties, or even against the City of *London* itself, be never so apparent, neither King nor Parliament could expect any Petition or Address against his Measures or Designs; and the Silence of the City of *London* would be a Precedent for all the Cities and Corporations of the Kingdom.

Thus, Sir, the Behaviour of the Aldermen upon this Occasion, is not only a Proof of their having made a bad

a bad Use of the Power lodged in their Hands, but also it must convince us, that this Power may be of the most dangerous Consequence in Time to come; and their Behaviour upon another Occasion that has been mentioned, must shew, that as long as they are vested with this Negative, they will court the Favour of the Minister, and contemn the Resentment of their Fellow Citizens. What I mean, Sir, is their breaking through the established Custom of the City, and without any Reason setting aside a Gentleman who, according to the Custom, ought to have been preferred to the Honour of being Lord Mayor. The Behaviour of the Citizens upon a former Occasion was no Precedent for the Behaviour of the Aldermen upon this. The Citizens had set a Gentleman aside for a very good Reason, for a Reason that was known and avowed, and for a Reason that must be approved of by every Man who does not approve of our late Convention with *Spain*. Was this a Reason for the Aldermen's setting aside a Gentleman without any Reason? I say, Sir, without any Reason known and avowed; for that they had a Reason I shall not deny, and that Reason was suspected, tho' it was such a one as they durst not avow. The Reason I mean is because they had private Orders from their Patron, the Minister, to set that Gentleman aside.

Having taken Notice, Sir, of the Reason the Aldermen were supposed to have for setting this Gentleman aside, I must give you the Reason, which the Citizens had for setting another Gentleman aside upon a former Occasion; and this I must do, because it has been said, that it was a high Presumption in the Citizens of *London* to take Notice of a Gentleman's Way of voting in this Assembly. Sir, it was so far from being a high Presumption, *that it was their Right and their Duty to do so*. Every Man in the Kingdom that has a Vote at any Election, has a Right to take Notice of every Gentleman's Behaviour in Parliament: He has not only a Right, but he is in Duty bound to take Notice of it, that

that if ever any such Gentleman should, upon any Occasion, apply to him for his Vote, he may grant or refuse his Request according to his Behaviour in Parliament. To say that this is an Incroachment upon the Freedom of Parliament is, in my Opinion, ridiculous: We may as well say, that the Esteem or Reproach a Gentleman gains by his Behaviour here, is an Incroachment upon his Freedom of voting; or we may as well say, that the Danger of a Gentleman's not being rechosen, in case he should by his Behaviour disoblige his Constituents, is a Restraint upon the Freedom of his Voting, and that therefore every Member ought to be chosen for Life; which is a Doctrine that Ministers may perhaps approve of, but, I am sure, it will never be inculcated by any Man who has a Regard for Liberty.

It was therefore no Presumption, Sir, but a Duty in the Citizens of *London*, to take Notice of the Behaviour of a Gentleman in Parliament, who applied to them for the Honour of being raised to the chief Magistracy of their City. His being their Representative, or the Representative of another Place, made no Difference: Every Gentleman, after he is chosen, becomes the Representative of the People of *England*; and if in that Post, either through Weakness or Corruption, he betrays or sacrifices the Interests of the People, surely no Part of the People ought again to chuse him into that or any other Office of Honour or Trust, which they have at their Disposal. This was the Case of the Gentleman set aside by the Citizens of *London*: In Parliament he had voted for approving the Convention with *Spain*, which, by a great Majority of them, was thought to be derogatory to the Honour, and destructive of the Trade and Navigation of their Country. If he did this through Weakness, he was unfit for being the chief Magistrate of such a great City; if through Corruption, surely they had good Reason not to put such a great Trust into such unclean Hands.

Besides this, Sir, the Citizens of *London* had another Reason for setting him aside. I hope it will be allowed,

allowed, that the Citizens of *London* have a Concern in the Choice that is made of Members of Parliament, for every Place in the Kingdom, as well, as for their own City. It is their Interest, because it is the publick Interest, to have such Men chosen for every County, City and Borough in the Kingdom, as have Ability enough to distinguish, and Honour enough to adhere to the true Interest of their Country. This Gentleman had, by his Behaviour in the preceding Session, convinced them that he was defective either in his Ability or Honesty; therefore it was their Interest not to have him chosen again, either for the Place he then represented, or for any other. Was their chusing him their Lord Mayor a Way to prevent this? Would it not have convinced the little Borough he then represented, that the Citizens of *London* approved of his Conduct in Parliament? And would not this have gone a great Way towards inducing them to chuse him a second Time? Therefore the Citizens of *London* were obliged to refuse chusing him their Lord Mayor, in order to prevent his being chosen a Member of the then ensuing new Parliament.

Thus it appears, Sir, that the Citizens of *London* had a very sufficient Reason for breaking through the established Custom, in not chusing this Gentleman as one of the two they were to return to the Court of Aldermen; and the Reason they had they publicly avowed long before the Election; so that the Gentleman had an Opportunity to justify himself if he had not been guilty of what was laid to his Charge: and he did endeavour to justify himself so far as related to Corruption, but he never denied his voting for the Convention, and consequently could not excuse, or free himself from the Imputation of Weakness, which was the chief Foundation of the Resolution to set him aside.

But, Sir, with regard to the Gentleman set aside by the Aldermen, there was not the least Objection to his Conduct, unless it was that of his appearing strenuously against the Convention, and being nearly related to a worthy City Magistrate, who has for several
Years,

Years, with great Strength of Reason, opposed and exposed the late Minister's Measures in this House. His appearing against the Convention, and consequently against the City's conferring any Honour upon a Gentleman, who had done what he could to get it established, was a Duty he owed to his Country, and particularly to the City of *London*, if he thought it an infamous and pernicious Treaty which was the Opinion he declared he had of it, as soon as it made its Appearance in Publick. In this Respect, therefore, he could not be so much as suspected of any Thing that was criminal in his Behaviour. If he judged amiss of that Treaty, he might be accused of Weakness; but surely this Accusation could not be brought against him by any of those who, both in their private Conversation, and by their publick Conduct, had declared themselves of the same Opinion, which was the Case of several of those Aldermen who voted for setting him aside; they had often, and before many Witnesses, declared their having a very bad Opinion of that Treaty, and they had joined with their Brethren in voting and presenting a Petition to Parliament against it. Therefore the Conduct of those Men, at least in setting that Gentleman aside, and thereby breaking through a Custom established for the preserving the Peace of the City, must be allowed to have been without any Reason they could avow, and consequently must be allowed to have been most extraordinary and unusual. If it was so, their joining with the other Aldermen in the Amendment that has been mentioned, was a persisting in their Error, and adding a new Crime to their former, in both which they could, in my Opinion, have no other Motive but that of currying Favour with the Minister.

I have said, Sir, that while the Aldermen are vested with the Negative, they will court the Favour of the Minister, and contemn the Resentment of their Fellow-Citizens; and their Behaviour upon both these Occasions is a Proof of what I say. There was not in the City of *London* a more popular Man than the
Gentleman

Gentleman they set aside: This they knew, and they knew that their setting him aside would provoke the Resentment of their Fellow-Citizens against them; but as long as they thought themselves sure of the protection of the Minister, and that his protection would be sufficient, they despised the Resentment of their Fellow-Citizens so much, that they set the same Gentleman aside a second and third Time, tho' returned to them each time by the unanimous Voice of the Citizens; and they would probably shewn the same Contempt of the Resentment of their Fellow-Citizens a fourth Time, had they had the same Opinion of the protection they depended on, or the Favour they courted; but before the next Opportunity, which was on *Michaelmas* Day 1741, a new Parliament had been returned, and from the Returns it appeared, that a Majority of this House would probably declare against their Patron the Minister, from whence they judged, that his Protection was no longer to be depended on, nor his Favour worth seeking, especially at any Risk; therefore they then thought it not safe to incur again the Resentment of their Fellow-Citizens, and perhaps the Resentment of the next Minister; consequently they then chose for Lord Mayor the Gentleman they had before so often rejected, he being then again returned to them by the unanimous Voice of the Citizens.

Thus, Sir, the Behaviour of the Aldermen, upon this Occasion, is a Proof of what I have said; and their threatening to put the Negative upon the Common Council's returning Thanks to another very popular Magistrate, unless the Common-Council would agree to have the Question modelled according to their Lik'ing, is another Proof of the same Doctrine; consequently I must conclude, that as long as the Aldermen of the City of *London*, are vested with this Negative Power, a Majority of that will probably condemn the Resentment of their Fellow-Citizens, and court the Favour of the Minister for the Time being. But it may be asked, why will they not do
the

the same, should they be divested of this Negative Power? To this the Answer is very short and easy: It will not then be worth the Minister's While to come up to their Price. I have not so bad an opinion of Mankind as to say, that every Man has his Price; but this, I am afraid, may be justly said, that the Majority of Mankind have a Price, if it be worth the Purchaser's While to come up to it. With Regard to those that have a Price, it is certain that every Man's Price depends in a great Measure upon the Fortune he is possessed of, and the Reputation he has acquired in the World. Now the Aldermen of the City of *London* are generally Men of an easy Fortune, and always Men that by their former Conduct have acquired some Reputation in the World; we cannot therefore suppose, that any one of them, or at least not many of them, are Men of a small Price; and as long as they can do a Minister but little Service, he will not give any of them a large Price. They will therefore continue faithful to their Country and their City, not because they are proof against Corruption, but because they are not worth the Minister's While, or perhaps not in his Power, to corrupt. By investing them with this Negative, you have made it worth a Minister's While to come up to their Price: Divest them of this Negative, it will be no longer worth his While, and they will neither court his Favour, nor contemn the Resentment of their Fellow-Citizens, if they find they are to get nothing by it but Reproach.

This Doctrine, Sir, That there must be a Proportion between the Service a Man can do, and the Price he may probably insist on, is so well understood by those who have studied the Art of Corruption, that all our Ministers who have aimed at arbitrary Power, have endeavoured, as much as possible, to throw the Government of every subordinate Society and Community in the Kingdom into a few Hands. They know that the Majority of a few Men of Fortune may be purchased at a less price than the Majority of a great
Number

Number of Men, who live by their Business; and the Reason is very plain, because the former, by accepting a Bribe, lose nothing but their Reputation, whereas the latter lose their Reputation and with it their Subsistence, for a Tradesman's Business generally depend upon his Reputation, and therefore in a *Smithfield* Way of Reckoning, he will not accept of a Bribe, unless it be such as may enable him for the future to live without Business. Besides this, the Value a Man puts upon his Reputation is very far from being always in proportion to his Fortune. A Man of 10*l.* a Year might reject with Disdain a Bribe of 10*l.*; and yet the same Man, were he possessed of a *Thousand* a Year, might sell his Reputation for 1000*l.* There are many other Arguments for shewing, that the Majority of a few Men of Fortune may be more easily purchased than the Majority of a great Number of Men of small Fortunes, and these Arguments have been confirmed by the Experience of all Ages and Countries.

For this Reason, I say, Sir, all our Ministers, whose Ambition led them, or whose previous Crimes forced them to aim at arbitrary Power, have endeavoured to throw all our subordinate Societies and Communities into as few Hands as possible; and for the same Purpose they have endeavoured to get all Magistracies and Offices depending upon the Choice of the People, established for Life, and to throw as much Power as they could into the Hands of those popular Magistrates, who by any new Law or antient Custom are chosen for Life. Such Endeavours, Sir, are all equally designed to make Corruption the more successful. Those who are versed in that filthy Art know, that a Magistrate chosen for Life is better worth corrupting than one who is chosen but for a Year or a short Term of Years, and that the more they may give, the more likely they are to succeed in Corruption. They likewise know, that a Man who has once prostituted himself, and thereby forfeited his Reputation, is like a Prostitute of the other Sex;

Sex : He becomes cheaper every Day he lives, and will at last prostitute himself, if it were for nothing else but the Pleasure, or rather Habit, of Prostitution.

These are the Arts pursued, Sir, these are the Maxims laid down by all those who are aiming at arbitrary Power, and in order to render their Maxims palatable to the credulous and unthinking Part of Mankind, their Advocates are instructed to rail at popular Power, and to load all numerous popular Assemblies with Faction, Sedition, Turbulence, Unsteadiness, and I do not know how many other Bugbears. If we were to believe these ministerial Tools, who are generally very well paid, and who, like true Lawyers, argue for their Fee without the least Regard to any Thing else : I say, if we were to believe these ministerial Tools, we must think, that the People of every Country ought to be treated like Madmen : That they ought to be kept in Chains, to prevent their doing themselves a Mischief. But however fond some Gentlemen may be of preserving or increasing the Power of the Crown, while they themselves are in the Sunshine of it, I hope, this House will take Care to leave as much Power in the Hands of the People as may be sufficient for preserving their Liberties ; and when we find that the Power of the People have, by the Arts and Insinuations of Ministers, been so diminished as not to be a proper Balance for the Power of the Crown, we ought, and I hope, we always shall take Care to increase the one, and diminish the Weight of the other.

When I consider our antient Constitution, and reflect upon the great Power formerly lodged in the Hands of the People, I am really surprized, Sir, to hear any Gentleman talk of the Danger of throwing too much Power into their Hands. The Power of the People ! alas, Sir ! they have scarcely any Power left. The Crown has already ingrossed the greatest Part of what the People were possessed of by the antient Constitution of our Government, and will, if we do not take special Care, very soon engross the whole ; for
when

when the Crown gets the direction of that Power, which by the remaining Forms of our Constitution is left in the Hands of the People, the Crown gets the Substance, and leaves the People only the Shadow. What signifies it to the People to have the Choice of any Magistrate or Officer, if that Magistrate or Officer be, as soon as chosen, brought by Corruption under the Direction of the Crown? What would it signify to the People to have the choice of their Representatives in this House should, as soon as chosen, be brought by Corruption under the Direction of the Crown? In such a Case, would the People have any thing more than the Shadow of Power? And I will say, that it would be much better for them to be without that Shadow; because the Expence the Crown is put to in corrupting those Magistrates and Representatives, must be all furnished by the People; and at the same time the public Service must be sacrificed, by being put into the Hands of those who have nothing to recommend them but their Venality.

We must therefore, Sir, never talk of the Power of the People, unless it be such a one as can never be brought under the Direction of the Crown, either by Force, Fraud, or Corruption; and if this were the Case with respect to every Power now lodged in the Hands of the People, they would not have near so much as they had in the happy Times of some of our Forefathers. In former Times our Counties had the Power of chusing almost all their Magistrates and Officers; they chose their Generals in time of War, they chose their Sheriffs, and their Conservators of the Peace, as well as their Coroners and their Members of Parliament. Now they have nothing left but the choice of their Coroners and Members: As to their choice of Coroners, it is of very little signification; because Care has been taken to leave very little Power in the Hands of that Officer: And as to their choice of Members, it would be of no signification, if the Crown should once come to make itself Master of the Elections for all our little Boroughs, which is already
in

in a great Measure the case. The People of our Counties have therefore very little Power now left in their Hands; and as to our Cities and Boroughs, some of them, 'tis true, particularly *London*, retain still something of our antient *Saxon* Constitution; but in many of them the People have very little to do with the Government even of their own City or Borough, and consequently have no Power at all in their Hands; for in some the old Magistrates chuse the new, and in others the Election has been confined to such a small Number, that it may be justly said, the People have no share in it.

Thus it must appear, Sir, that the People have not now near so much Power as they had formerly, and if we are now more peaceable, I am sure, we are much less happy; for I shall never think, that Happiness consists in indolent Tranquility and slavish Submission under Chains. If this be Happiness, shall grant, that it is more securely established under an absolute, than under a free Government; but as I think, that political Happiness consists in being free from Oppression, I shall never be for putting it into the Power of any Prince, or any Administration, to oppress the People. Peace, I shall admit, Sir, is a very good Thing, but do not let us give up our Liberties for fear of disturbing our Peace. We have preserved both for many Generations, and tho' I cannot say without Interruption, yet I will say, that those Interruptions never proceeded from the Factionousness of the People, but from their Power to oppose those who were ambitiously aiming at the Destruction of Liberty. If they part with that Power, they may indeed have Peace, but they will have Slavery and Oppression along with it. This, Sir, is a certain Consequence; and therefore it is our Business in this House, to attend in the most serious Manner to the Ebbings and Flowings of the People's Power, and to restore it, as often as we find it has been too much diminished by any rash or ill-judged Regulation; which, in my Opinion, is the Case with Regard to the

the

the Law now proposed to be repealed, It was not contrived for amending what was thought too popular in the Form of Government of our capital City : It was contrived for preventing that City's being ever able to vindicate either its own or its Country's Liberties. This is the only Purpose it has served, this is the only Purpose it can serve ; and therefore I shall be for having it repealed.

N. B. The Behaviour of Sir *John Bernard*, and Mr. *Heathcoate*, on the above Occasion, who were both *ALDERMEN*, shews the Difference between *ALDERMEN* chosen by the *FREE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE* ; and *Aldermen who elect one another*.

P. S. I had forgot to shew how the Lord Mayor of *London* is chosen ; he must be chosen out of the Board of Aldermen ; and must have actually served the Office of Sheriff, two of the Board of Aldermen so qualified, are put in Election by the *UNITED VOICE* of the Whole *CITY OF LONDON*, one of whom must be chosen by a Majority of the *WHOLE COMMON COUNCIL* as the Law now stands : But while the *Negative* subsisted, the Aldermen had a Power of refusing the Person fixed on by the Commons, and consequently the other must be chosen,

F I N I S.

the law now proposed is to be passed, it was not
consequently intended that the law should be too
it in the form of Government or not. It is
law is not intended to be passed, but it is
this is the only law that is intended to be
passed. It is the only law that is intended to be
passed. It is the only law that is intended to be
passed.

It is the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is

It is the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is

6 DE 58

It is the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is
the intention of the law to be passed, and it is

W. I. L.

